Zeta's Right . . . Again!

Zeta's Right . . . Again!
Posted By: 
Friday, July 20, 2007 11:50 am

This has been repeated over and over by Nancy Lieder and the Zeta Folks. Countries will have to look inward, the troops needed at home.

: The Green Zone Baghdad – July 13, 2007

: “Yesterday, one of my good friends from another office was telling me
: they were going to start issuing armored vests to us office types
: because of the growing danger from mortars. We are being shelled
: daily and, like everything else, casualties are way underreported .
: But more important than the flak vests was a file he had copied out
: and which he gave to me to smuggle out of the country. As I have
: said, we have strict censorship here on all incoming and outgoing
: snail mail, email, phone calls and so on.

: This report is so serious I am making a prйcis of it and am even now
: sending it around to various news outlets, both Stateside and
: elsewhere. I have my sources and believe me, the CIC people here are
: so stupid they couldn’t pour piss out of a boot if the directions
: were on the bottom.

: It states that because of “growing popular unrest in the United States,
: caused by the prolonged war in Iraq .coupled with obvious
: Congressional inaction,” the U.S. military has drawn up plans for
: combating domestic U.S. civil insurrections. This is not a
: theoretical study but a very specific one. Units to be used
: domestically are listed in detail as are detention centers, etc.

: As a result of this, plans are now in train to segregate, retrain and
: reequip certain anti-insurgent U.S. military units now serving in
: Iraq and to prepare them for quick transfer back to the United States
: for use "as needed" The Pentagon command believes that such
: civil insurrections are not only a possibility but a very real
: probability in the event that the President and his advisors maintain
: their present course vis a vis the Iraqi war.

: It is interesting to note that "foreign intelligence
: representatives, now active in the United States” (read Mossad) are
: to be subject to “arrest, confinement and eventual deportation to
: their country of origin."

: The report and several attached ones, run to almost 900 pages and cannot
: be put up in their current form. However, I will list some of the
: more important data here: Classification: Top Secret-Noforn as of 1
: June 2007

: Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to the DOD and DOD
: contractors only to maintain operations security. This determination
: was made on 1 June 2007. Other requests for this document must be
: referred to (redacted)
: Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure
: of contents or reconstruction of the document. ….

: This publication uses the term insurgent to describe those taking part
: in any activity designed to undermine or to overthrow the established
: authorities……

: Counterinsurgency is those military, paramilitary, political, economic,
: psychological, and civicactions taken by a government to defeat
: insurgency (JP 1-02). It is an offensive approach involving all
: elements of national power; it can take place across the range of
: operations and spectrum of conflict …

: In dealing with the local populace, the primary aims must be to:
: •Protect the population.
: •Establish local political institutions.
: •Reinforce local governments.
: •Eliminate insurgent capabilities.
: •Exploit information from local sources. …

: An insurgency is organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a
: constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict
: (JP 1-02). It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to
: weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent
: control. Political power is the central issue in an insurgency.

: An insurgent organization normally consists of four elements:
: Leadership.
: Combatants (main forces, regional forces, local forces).
: Cadre (local political leaders that are also called the militants).
: Mass base (the bulk of the membership). …

: A perceived serious potential of dissident American groups rising up
: against constituted authority has been clearly identified by
: counter-intelligence agencies.. The stated cause for such an uprising
: appear to be growing dissatisfaction with the course and conduct of
: the war in Iraq, the chronic inability of Congress to deal with
: various pressing issues and the perception of widespread corruption
: and indifference to public needs.

: The support of the people, passive or active then, is the center of
: gravity. It must be gained in whatever proportion is necessary to
: sustain the insurgent movement (or, contrariwise, to defeat it). As
: in any political campaign, all levels of support are relative.

: Insurgent movements begin as “fire in the minds of men.” Insurgent
: leaders commit themselves to building a new world. They construct the
: organization to carry through this desire. Generally, popular
: grievances become insurgent causes when interpreted and shaped by the
: insurgent leadership. The insurgency grows if the cadre that is local
: insurgent leaders and representatives can establish a link between
: the insurgent movement and the desire for solutions to grievances
: sought by the local population.

: Insurgent leaders will exploit opportunities created by government
: security force actions. The behavior of security forces is critical.
: Lack of security force discipline leads to alienation, and security
: force abuse of the populace is a very effective insurgent recruiting
: tool. Consequently, specific insurgent tactical actions are often
: planned to frequently elicit overreaction from security force
: individuals and units.

: Insurgencies are dynamic political movements, resulting from real or
: perceived grievance or neglect that leads to alienation from an
: established government.

: A successful counterinsurgency will result in the neutralization by the
: state of the insurgency and its effort to form a counterstate. While
: many abortive insurgencies are defeated by military and police
: actions alone, if an insurgency has tapped into serious grievances
: and has mobilized a significant portion of the population, simply
: returning to the status quo may not be an option. Reform may be
: necessary, but reform is a matter for the state, using all of its
: human and material resources. Security forces are only one such
: resource. The response must be multifaceted and coordinated, yet
: states typically charge their security forces with “waging
: counterinsurgency.” This the security forces cannot do alone.

: These imperatives are—
: · Facilitate establishment or reestablishment of a ‘legitimate
: government’.
: · Counterinsurgency requires perseverance.
: · Foster popular support for the incumbent US government.
: · Prepare to perform functions and conduct operations that are outside
: normal scope of training.
: · Coordinate with US governmental departments and agencies, and with
: vital non-governmental, agencies.

: Urban operations.
: · Protection of government facilities.
: · Protection of infrastructure.
: · Protection of commercial enterprises vital to the HN economy.
: · Protection of cultural facilities.
: · Prevention of looting.
: · Military police functions.
: · Close interaction with civilians.
: · Assistance with reconstruction projects.
: · Securing the national borders.
: · Training or retraining a national military police and security force.
: Establishing and maintaining local government credibility.
: · Contributing local government is both tangible and psychological.
: Local security forces must reinforce and be integrated into the plan
: at every stage.
: · Facilitate and use information and intelligence obtained from local
: sources to gain access to the insurgent’s economic and social base of
: support, order of battle, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

: Army forces help local pro-government police, paramilitary, and military
: forces perform counterinsurgency, area security, or local security
: operations. They advise and assist in finding, dispersing, capturing,
: and destroying the insurgent force.

: US forces may conduct offensive operations to disrupt and destroy
: insurgent combat formations. These operations prevent the insurgents
: from attacking government-controlled areas.

: There are many organizations and extensive resources available to aid
: counterinsurgent forces.

: Commanders should not overlook the aid these organizations may provide.
: All forces assigned an AO or function should determine which
: departments and agencies are assisting in that AO and coordinate
: actions so that there is no duplication of effort.

: Such departments, councils and agencies include—
: · National Security Council.
: · Department of Defense.
: · Department of State.
: · Department of Justice.
: · Department of the Treasury.
: · Department of Homeland Security.
: · Department of Agriculture.
: · Department of Commerce.
: · Central Intelligence Agency.
: · Department of Transportation

: Various governmental departments directly administer or support other
: governmental agencies. Examples of these US agencies are—
: · The US Coast Guard (under Department of Homeland Security).
: · The Federal Bureau of Investigation (under Department of Justice).
: · Immigration Customs Enforcement (under Department of Homeland
: Security).
: · Federal Communications Commission

: . The proper application of force is a critical component to any
: successful counterinsurgency operation. In a counterinsurgency, the
: center of gravity is public support. In order to defeat an insurgent
: force, US forces must be able to separate insurgents from the
: population. At the same time, US forces must conduct themselves in a
: manner that enables them to maintain popular domestic support.
: Excessive or indiscriminant use of force is likely to alienate the
: local populace, thereby increasing support for insurgent forces.
: Insufficient use of force results in increased risks to US forces and
: perceived weaknesses that can jeopardize the mission by emboldening
: insurgents and undermining domestic popular support. Achieving the
: appropriate balance requires a thorough understanding of the nature
: and causes of the insurgency, the end state, and the military’s role
: in a counterinsurgency operation. Nevertheless, US forces always
: retain the right to use necessary and proportional force for
: individual and unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or
: demonstrated hostile intent.

: The media, print and broadcast (radio, television and the Internet),
: play a vital role in societies involved in a counterinsurgency.
: Members of the media have a significant influence and shaping impact
: on political direction, national security objectives, and policy and
: national will. The media is a factor in military operations. It is
: their right and obligation to report to their respective audiences on
: the use of military force. They demand logistic support and access to
: military operations while refusing to be controlled. Their desire for
: immediate footage and on-the-spot coverage of events, and the
: increasing contact with units and Soldiers (for example, with
: embedded reporters) require commanders and public affairs officers to
: provide guidance to leaders and Soldiers on media relations. However,
: military planners must provide and enforce ground rules to the media
: to ensure operations security. Public affairs offices plan for daily
: briefings and a special briefing after each significant event because
: the media affect and influence each potential target audience
: external and internal to the AO. Speaking with the media in a
: forward-deployed area is an opportunity to explain what our
: organizations and efforts have accomplished.

: Continuous PSYOP are mounted to—
: · Counter the effects of insurgent propaganda.
: · Relate controls to the security and well-being of the population.
: · Portray a favorable governmental image.
: .Control measures must—
: · Be authorized by national laws and regulations (counterparts should be
: trained not to improvise unauthorized measures).
: · Be tailored to fit the situation (apply the minimum force required to
: achieve the de-sired result).
: · Be supported by effective local intelligence.
: · Be instituted in as wide an area as possible to prevent bypass or
: evasion.
: · Be supported by good communications.
: · Be enforceable.
: · Be lifted as the need diminishes.
: · Be compatible, where possible, with local customs and traditions.
: · Establish and maintain credibility of local government.

: A control program may be developed in five phases: · Securing and
: defending the area internally and externally.
: · Organizing for law enforcement.
: · Executing cordon and search operations.
: · Screening and documenting the population (performing a detailed
: census).
: · Performing public administration, to include resource control.

: Support to the judiciary may be limited to providing security to the
: existing courts or may lead to more comprehensive actions to build
: local, regional, and national courts and the required support
: apparatus. To avoid overcrowding in police jails, the courts must
: have an efficient and timely magistrate capability, ideally
: co-located with police stations and police jails, to review cases for
: trial.

: Cordon and search is a technique used by military and police forces in
: both urban and rural environments. It is frequently used by
: counterinsurgency forces conducting a population and resource control
: mission against small centers of population or subdivisions of a
: larger community. To be effective, cordon and search operations must
: have sufficient forces to effectively cordon off and thoroughly
: search target areas, to include subsurface areas.

: PSYOP, civil affairs, and spe#####t interrogation teams should augment
: cordon and search orces to increase the effectiveness of operations.
: Consider the following when conducting cordon and search operations:
: Cordon and search operations may be conducted as follows: Disposition
: of troops should—
: · Facilitate visual contact between posts within the cordon.
: · Provide for adequate patrolling and immediate deployment of an
: effective re-serve force.

: Priority should be given to—
: · Sealing the administrative center of the community.
: · Occupying all critical facilities.
: · Detaining personnel in place.
: · Preserving and securing all records, files, and other archives.

: Key facilities include—
: · Administrative buildings.
: · Police stations.
: · News media facilities.
: · Post offices.
: · Communications centers.
: · Transportation offices and motor pools.
: · Prisons and other places of detention.
: · Schools.
: · Medical facilities.

: Search Techniques include—
: · Search teams of squad size organized in assault, support, and security
: elements.

: One target is assigned per team.
: · Room searches are conducted by two-person teams.
: · Room search teams are armed with pistols, assault weapons, and
: automatic weapons.
: · Providing security for search teams screening operations and
: facilities.

: Pre-search coordination includes—
: · Between control personnel and screening team leaders.
: · Study of layout plans.
: · Communications, that is, radio, whistle, and hand signals.
: · Disposition of suspects.
: · On-site security.
: · Guard entrances, exits (to include the roof), halls, corridors, and
: tunnels.
: · Assign contingency tasks for reserve.
: · Room searches conducted by two- or three-person teams.
: · Immobilize occupants with one team member.
: · Search room with other team member.
: · Search all occupants. When available, a third team member should be
: the re-corder.
: · Place documents in a numbered envelope and tag the associated
: individual with a corresponding number.

: Screening and documentation include following: · Systematic
: identification and registration.
: · Issuance of individual identification cards containing—
: A unique number.
: Picture of individual.
: Personal identification data.
: Fingerprints.
: An official stamp (use different colors for each administration region).
: Family group census cards, an official copy of which is retained at the
: local po-lice agency. These must include a picture and appropriate
: personal data.
: Frequent use of mobile and fixed checkpoints for inspection,
: identification, and reg-istration of documents.
: Preventing counterfeiting of identification and registration documents
: by laminat-ing and embossing.
: Programs to inform the population of the need for identification and
: registration.

: Covert surveillance is a collection effort with the responsibility fixed
: at the intelligence/security division or detective division of the
: police department. Covert techniques, ranging from application of
: sophisticated electronics systems to informants, should include—

: Informant nets. Reliability of informants should be verified. Protection
: of identity is a must.

: Block control. Dividing a community or populated area into zones where a
: trusted resident reports on the activities of the population. If the
: loyalty of block leaders is questionable, an informant net can be
: established to verify questionable areas.

: Units designated for counterinsurgency operations
: · 115th MIB, Schofield, HI
: · 704th MIB, Fort Made, MD, Collaboration with NSA
: · 513st MIB, Fort Gordon, GA in Collaboration with NSA
: · Arlington Hall Station, VA
: · Aberdeen Proving Ground (Maryland)
: · US Army Intelligence and Security Command – INSCOM- Huachuca ( Arizona
: )
: · INTELLIGENCE THREAT and ANALYSIS CENTER ( Center Analysis for threat
: and Intelligence )
: · 501st Military Intelligence Brigade EAC
: · 3rd Military Intelligence Battalion Exploitation Area
: [ OLD LINK REMOVED ]/Archives/a2720.htm#004

: Also see: The Voice of the White House August 2, 2004 - scroll down to
: July 31, 2004